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This is an official
CDC HEALTH ADVISORY
Third Possible SARS Case Reported in China; Influenza A (H5N1) Infections 
Reported in Vietnam
This advisory provides updated information and recommendations following recent reports of cases of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Guangdong Province, China, and human cases of influenza A (H5N1) virus 
infections in Vietnam. No travel alerts or advisories to these regions have been issued by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), but increased vigilance is advised for ill persons traveling to the United States 
from Guangdong Province and Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea.
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
Recent SA R S  Cases in China
On January 13, 2004, the Chinese Ministry of Health (MOH) and the World Health Organization (WHO) reported a 
new suspect case SA RS in a 35-year-old man living in Guangdong Province, China. This case is the third recent 
report of suspected or confirmed SA RS in patients in southern China. No link has been established at present 
between the confirmed case and the two recent suspect SA RS cases, and the source of exposure for all three 
cases is unclear.
On January 5, 2004, Chinese and WHO authorities announced that laboratory results confirmed evidence of 
SARS-associated coronavirus infection (SARS-CoV) in a 32-year-old man in Guangdong Province who had 
become ill on December 16, 2003. On January 8, 2004, a suspect case of SARS was reported in a 20-year-old 
woman who works in a restaurant in Guangdong Province and had onset of illness on December 25, 2003. On 
January 12, 2004, a suspect case of SA RS was reported in a 35-year-old man from Guangdong Province who 
had onset of illness on December 31, 2003, and was admitted to Guangdong People's Hospital and placed in 
isolation on January 6. All three patients are reported to be doing well, and no signs or symptoms of SARS-like 
illness have been reported among their identified contacts to date. Details on the clinical features and laboratory 
results of the 2 suspect SA RS cases are not yet available.
Recommended U.S. SA R S  Control Measures
In light of these reports, the CDC is recommending that U.S. physicians maintain a greater index of suspicion of 
SARS in patients who require hospitalization for radiographically confirmed pneumonia or acute respiratory 
distress syndrome (ARDS) AND who have a history of travel to Guangdong Province (or close contact with an ill 
person with a history of recent travel to Guangdong Province) in the 10 days before onset of symptoms. When 
such patients are identified, the following actions should be taken:
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• Patients should immediately be placed in appropriate isolation precautions for SA RS (i.e., contact and
airborne precautions.)
• Patients should promptly be reported to the state or local health department.
• Patients should promptly be tested for evidence of SARS-CoV infection as part of the diagnostic evaluation
(see Appendix 2 ” Updated Guidelines for Collecting Specimens from Potential SARS Patients,” in the 
CDC document, “ In the Absence of SARS-CoV Transmission Worldwide: Guidance for Surveillance, 
Clinical and Laboratory Evaluation, and Reporting” at www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/absenceofsars.htm
• The health department should identify, evaluate, and monitor relevant contacts of the patient, as indicated.
In particular, the health status of household contacts or persons who provided care to symptomatic 
patients should be assessed.
In addition, CDC continues to recommend that health care providers and public health officials identify and report 
patients who require hospitalization for radiographically confirmed pneumonia or ARDS without identifiable 
etiology AND who have one of the following risk factors in the 10 days before the onset of illness:
• Travel to mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, or close contact with an ill person with a history of recent
travel to one of these areas, OR
• Employment in an occupation associated with a risk for SARS-CoV exposure (e.g., health care worker with
direct patient contact; worker in a laboratory that contains live SARS-CoV), OR
• Part of a cluster of cases of atypical pneumonia without an alternative diagnosis.
Diagnostic testing for SA RS should be considered in such patients, as described in the guidelines at 
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/absenceofsars.htm. Infection control practitioners and other health care personnel 
should also be alert for clusters of pneumonia among two or more health care workers who work in the same 
facility.
Advice for Travelers (SA RS)
At this time, WHO and CDC have not issued any alerts or advisories for travel to China 
(www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/travel_alertadvisory.htm). Previous SA RS research has shown that SA RS can be 
controlled and contained through early detection, isolation of suspect cases, and tracing of their contacts.
On the basis of limited available data, it would be prudent for travelers to China to avoid visiting live food markets 
and avoid direct contact with civets and other wildlife from these markets. Although there is no evidence that 
direct contact with civets or other wild animals from live food markets has led to cases of SARS, viruses very 
similar to SARS-CoV - the virus that causes SA RS—have been found in these animals. In addition, some persons 
working with these animals have evidence of infection with SARS-CoV or a very similar virus.
US Bans Importation of Civet Cats
On January 13, 2004, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced an immediate embargo 
on the importation of civets to the United States (http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/civet_ban_exec_order.htm). 
These small animals have been identified as a possible link to SARS transmission in China. The embargo, which 
applies to dead and live civets as well as civet products, will remain in place until further notice. Civet products
that have been processed to render them noninfectious, such as fully taxidermied animals and finished trophies, 
are not included in the embargo. The ban does not apply to civet cats approved by CDC for importation for 
educational or scientific purposes.
More Information About SA RS
For more information about current U.S. SA RS control guidelines, see the CDC document, “ In the Absence of 
SARS-CoV Transmission Worldwide: Guidance for Surveillance, Clinical and Laboratory Evaluation, and 
Reporting” at www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/absenceofsars.htm. The document is part of CDC's draft Public Health 
Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/sarsprepplan.htm.
For additional information about the reported SA RS cases in China, see the Web sites of CDC (www.cdc.gov) 
and WHO (www.who.int/en/).
Influenza A (H5N1) Virus Infections 
Recent Influenza A (H5N1) Cases
Since the end of October 2003, 14 persons (13 children and 1 adult) in Vietnam have been admitted from 
surrounding provinces to hospitals in Hanoi for severe respiratory illness. Among the 14 patients, three (2 
children and 1 adult) have had avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infections confirmed by testing conducted at the 
National Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology in Hanoi and in Hong Kong. Twelve of the patients, including 11 
children and the mother of one of the deceased children, have died.
Influenza A (H5N1) viruses normally circulate among wild birds but can infect poultry and rarely have infected 
people in the past. In 1997, 18 persons in Hong Kong were hospitalized because of influenza A (H5N1) infections 
and six of them died. In 2003, two residents of Hong Kong who traveled to China developed influenza A (H5N1) 
virus infections and one of them died. In Vietnam, large outbreaks of influenza A (H5N1) have been reported 
among poultry in the southern and northern regions of the country. WHO has reported that the H5N1 strain 
implicated in the outbreak has now been partially sequenced. All genes are of avian origin, indicating that the 
virus that caused death in the three confirmed cases had not yet acquired human genes. The acquisition of 
human genes increases the likelihood that a virus of avian origin can be readily transmitted from one human to 
another.
Staff from CDC will travel to Vietnam to work with WHO and Vietnam's human and animal health authorities to 
evaluate the situation, including patterns of transmission of the influenza A (H5N1) viruses.
During December 2003, an outbreak of avian influenza A (H5N1) was reported among poultry in South Korea. 
Earlier this week, Japan reported the deaths of 6,000 chickens on a single farm in the western part of Honshu due 
to influenza A (H5N1) virus infection. No human cases of infection with the avian influenza virus have been 
reported in either of these outbreaks.
Enhanced U.S. Influenza Surveillance
At this time, CDC recommends enhanced surveillance efforts by state and local health departments, hospitals, 
and clinicians to identify patients who have been hospitalized with unexplained pneumonia, ARDS, or severe 
respiratory illness AND who have traveled to Vietnam, South Korea, and Japan within 10 days from onset of 
symptoms
All such patients should be tested for influenza virus infection; these tests should include viral culture of 
nasopharyngeal and throat swabs. All influenza A viruses should be subtyped, and those that cannot be identified 
as H3 or H1 viruses should be sent immediately to CDC for testing for influenza A (H5N1).
CDC will make additional recommendations on enhanced surveillance if influenza A (H5N1) activity continues to 
evolve.
SA R S  and Influenza A(H5N1)
There is considerable potential for the clinical presentation and travel history of persons with either SA RS or 
influenza A (H5N1) infection to overlap. Therefore, the following actions should be taken:
• Influenza A infection should be considered in the differential diagnosis when evaluating a SA RS patient.
• Laboratories should make subtyping of influenza A viruses isolated from potential SARS cases a priority.
• The laboratory should immediately notify the CDC's Influenza Branch if any influenza A virus cannot be
subtyped.
More Information About Influenza
For further details about the reported cases of influenza A(H5N1) in Vietnam, see the WHO Web site 
www.who.int/en/. Additional information about influenza is available on the CDC Web site at www.cdc.gov.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) protects people's health and safety by preventing and 
controlling diseases and injuries; enhances health decisions by providing credible information on critical health 
issues; and promotes healthy living through strong partnerships with local, national and international
organizations.
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